

Communist Supply Shipments  
Through Cambodia and Laos  
Apr-May 1969

25X1

10 Apr 69

No Date Handwritten notes on hours required to offload ships

25X1

30 Apr 69

to DD/ER memo re Unloading Military Cargo in  
Sihanoukville

Attachment: Tables on ship deliveries to Sihanoukville,  
by source of information, cargo desti-  
nation, unloading description, country  
of origin, Dec 1966-Apr 1969

No Date Indications of Traffic in Southern Panhandle of Laos

No Date Project 54.5436-A, Effect of the Bombing in Laos Since  
1 November 1968 (to 1st quarter of 1969)

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9 May 69

to Ch/TLC memo re Possibility of Communist  
Military Deliveries to Sihanoukville Destined for the  
Cambodian Armed Forces

9 May 69 Blind Memo re Analysis of Data on  (estimating  
crude average weight per case of truck deliveries)

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21 May 69

S-3027, Evaluation of CIA Reporting (Since the   
Report) on Arms Shipments to the VC via Cambodia

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Evaluation of CIA Reporting (Since the [ ] Report)

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on Arms Shipments to the VC via Cambodia

S-3,027

21 May 1969

[ ]  
I/TLC/ER

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EVALUATION OF CIA REPORTING ON ARMS SHIPMENTS TO THE VC VIA CAMBODIA

I. Reporting Since the Graham Report

CIA's clandestine services, since early December 1968, have provided

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[redacted] reports pertaining to (and tending to confirm) the shipment of arms through Cambodian channels for Vietnamese Communist forces in South Vietnam. (For a listing of these reports by source and subject, see

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[redacted]

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[redacted]

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[redacted] obtains information on arms deliveries from per-


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[redacted]

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clandestine sources who have provided information on the

movement of Communist arms supplies through Cambodia have each produced from

one to three reports. None of these sources has access comparable with that

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of the



Many of their reports were


derived by chance from subsources with only peripheral access to pertinent in-

formation.

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VI. Information on the Overland Route

25X1 Since the [ ] Report of December 1968, a re-examination and analysis of available information on logistic operations in the southern part of the Laotian Panhandle has provided some new intelligence, but none sufficiently conclusive to prove beyond doubt that the overland route is the basic logistic supply route to South Vietnam. Nevertheless, the evidence gathered during this re-examination did show that the enemy's logistic presence in the area continues to be substantial. Roadwatch data indicate sufficient tonnages continued to move into Laos from North Vietnam during the first quarter of 1969 to provide all of the requirements of Communist forces in the Panhandle and in all four Corps areas in South Vietnam for military supplies from external sources. (For details, see Appendix E).

We are still unable to document the extent of enemy activity in the southern Panhandle, but preliminary data from sensors seeded along Routes 96, 165, and 110 during the latter part of April show a substantially higher level of logistical activity than has been noted in roadwatch or pilot reports. Also, a growing number of guerrilla team reports thus far in 1969 have indicated the presence of

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trucks in the tri-border area.

In general, little new information has become available to us on Communist logistical activity from the tri-border area south to III Corps in South Vietnam. It does not appear, however, that reconnaissance team efforts against this area have been increased in the same degree as have efforts against the tri-border area and border areas of northern III Corps.

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By comparison, offloading rates for Haiphong are considerably lower than those cited by the Sihanoukville Port Authority. During the first quarter of 1969, six five-hatch ships discharged cargo at hourly rates of 15 to 25 MT per ship. Furthermore, the Military Sea Transportation Service (MSTS) has provided ammunition offloading rates for other Asian ports which indicate that 8 MT per hour/gang/hatch at Sihanoukville would be a creditable performance. These unloading rates, all at ports with experienced gangs and an even flow of ammunition, were 7.5 MT for Thailand, 8.0 MT for Cam Ranh Bay, and 8.7 MT for Okinawa. Rates for Japan and the United States, with experienced gangs, many years of experience in unloading ammunition, and the best equipment were 13.9 MT.

All things considered, it is unlikely that 4,500 MT were unloaded from the Huang Shi in 65 hours. The required rate of 13.8 MT per hour/gang/hatch is close to the 15 MT per hour/gang/hatch maximum claimed by the Port Authority, and this maximum, based on a 17-hour work day, would probably be lowered by the loss of efficiency of around-the-clock operations. Moreover, implicit in the 13.8 MT per hour rate is an equal distribution of cargo among the five holds and simultaneous working of all five hatches. Equal distribution would not have been practical because of the smaller size of holds one and 5, and aerial photography of 1042 hours 3 April shows three hatches open, one closed and one obscured.

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Contribution to Paragraph 6 of D/I's Terms of Reference for Evaluation  
of Cambodian Reporting, 2 May 1969

Information on the Overland Route to the Tri-Border Area

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Since the [ ] Report (December, 1968), a re-examination and analysis of available information on logistic operations in Laos - photography, Forward Air Controller (FAC) reports, road-watch team reports, [ ] captured documents and prisoner reports, pilot reports, river watch teams, [ ] - has provided some new intelligence, but none sufficiently conclusive to prove beyond doubt that the overland route is the basic logistic supply route to South Vietnam.

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The re-examination did point up the continuing gaps and limitations in the data and the difficulty in using the sources to study the problem. In general, the information available to us on the southern part of the Laotian Panhandle continues to be inconsistent, not continuous over time, incomplete, and not useful for analyzing logistic flows. In addition, the collection effort in the area has continued to be much lower-keyed than in the northern part of the Panhandle. Roadwatch teams find it difficult to operate in the area due to enemy action against them. This, plus the dense vegetation and rough terrain hinder their placement and location near a road and cause reporting to be sporadic and incomplete. River watch teams on the Se Kong River in Laos also have similar problems and only one location has been manned during the past three years. In addition, there have been no attempts to monitor the trail system in the area, which presents a large gap in our knowledge of the enemy's resupply effort.

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Captured documents and prisoner interrogations have

yielded some information, but these reports are sporadic and only indicate

scattered instances of enemy activity. In some cases, the reports are highly

suspect.

The principal positive result of our re-examination has been the information obtained from aerial reconnaissance - particularly photography spanning a period of several years and pilot reports - which indicates a continuing substantial level of enemy logistic activity in the southern Panhandle.

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Aerial reconnaissance\* over selected targets in the area and along the major infiltration roads in the southern panhandle has provided one of the best sources of intelligence on enemy logistical activity in the area. Evidence of truck activity, sustained moderate to heavy usage of the principle roads, widespread indications of new road construction, road maintenance and rapid repair of damaged roads, POL drums scattered along the roads, as well as heavy trail activity, all point to a substantial enemy logistic presence along the 92/96 route corridor and the tri-border area.

Photography of new road construction and improvements has provided good evidence of the level of enemy operations in the area. During past dry seasons (September - June), the North Vietnamese concentrated on building and improving a road system parallel to the South Vietnamese border with entry into South Vietnam over a series of east-west feeder roads. This supply network was based on the Route 92/96 corridor which connects North Vietnam to the Tri-Border area, South Vietnam, and Cambodia.

Southeast of Attapeu, the Communists built a 20 mile alternate route in September 1968 that parallels a portion of Route 110. Further north, another alternate 8 miles long was built as part of a connection linking Routes 110 and 96. Other key bypasses were built along Route 96 north and south of Chavane to shorten the road and upgrade its capabilities, and to the east of Chavane bypasses were constructed along Route 165 to facilitate vehicular movement

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between the northern portion of Kontum Province in South Vietnam and the Cambodian border. Current traffic densities on Routes 165 and Route 96 south of Chavane do not appear to warrant such extensive construction.

However, aerial reconnaissance over the southern part of the panhandle has been comparatively light and the coverage not consistent over time. Night reconnaissance has been sparse meaning that much of the enemy's logistic movements probably has gone undetected. Furthermore, operational limitations such as adverse weather, cloud cover, and dense vegetation have restricted this source's utility. The end result is that aerial intelligence is necessarily spotty, its main use being to provide evidence of scattered developments rather than monitoring logistic movements over time.

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
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
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Guerrilla team reports, [redacted] have proven to be

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valuable in documenting the presence of trucks in the Tri-Border area. These reports have been increasing during the first months of 1969 and should prove a good source of future intelligence. However, operational considerations such as rugged terrain, dense jungle, and operating in a very hostile environment may

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prove to limit this source's usefulness. Preliminary analysis of recent guerilla operations indicates that the duration of a mission averages about 24 hours providing little chance for continuity of observations and subsequent quantitative analysis. Furthermore, these teams, to date, have been authorized to operate only within twenty kilometers of the South Vietnamese border, significantly limiting reconnaissance of the enemy's transborder roadnet.

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From Tri-Border to III Corps

In general the reporting on logistical movement and the Communist development of a logistical apparatus for materiel movement from the tri-border area to III Corps has not undergone a substantial qualitative change. However, there have been several developments worthy of note.

The first of these developments is new intelligence concerning trucks in the tri-border area. PW reports and captured documents have indicated that there are substantially more trucks in this area than had been previously suspected. One PW reported a Communist truck inventory in Attapeu Province, the southeastern most Province in Laos, of 200 vehicles. This is probably too high, but captured documents indicate the NVA 40th Artillery Regiment located in Kontum Province has a truck and prime mover inventory of at least 33 vehicles and perhaps as many as 90. Aircraft and friendly guerrilla reporting further indicates frequent enemy vehicular activity in the tri-border area. In fact, an enemy truck convoy (25 trucks) was attacked<sup>K</sup> by friendly aircraft in Kontum Province 25 kilometers south of the tri-border area resulting in 13 secondary explosions and 19 secondary fires.

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
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Supplies Entering Laos

Roadwatch reporting on the main access routes into Laos (Routes 8, 15, 137, and 1036) during the first quarter of 1969 indicate that sufficient tonnage continued to enter the northern end of the overland logistical route to provide all of the requirements of Communist forces in the Panhandle and all four Corps areas in South Vietnam for military supplies from external sources. Estimated requirements include allowances for the enemy's consumption/expenditure of supplies and losses.

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TRANSMITTAL SLIP		DATE	9 May
TO: <i>Chief D/I</i>			
ROOM NO.	BUILDING		
REMARKS:			
<p><i>Attached is the last section of our analysis of the 4500 tons</i></p>			
FROM:			
ROOM NO.			EXTENSION
FORM NO. 241 1 FEB 55		REPLACES FORM 36-8 WHICH MAY BE USED. (47)	

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9 May 1969

MEMORANDUM FOR: Chief, [REDACTED]

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THROUGH :

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SUBJECT : Possibility of Communist Military Deliveries to  
Sihanoukville Destined for the Cambodian Armed  
Forces

1. Reported shipments of Chinese Communist munitions to Sihanoukville totalling at least 9,300 tons from January-April 1969 probably would far exceed the military requirements of the Cambodian Armed Forces.

2. Communist military aid delivered to FARK from January 1966-June 1968 is estimated to have totalled about 2,000 metric tons including major ground forces weapons, small arms, aircraft, naval craft, and almost 1,500 tons of ammunition; however, this excludes construction materials, trucks and other support vehicles, spare parts, explosives, radars, and pharmaceuticals. These deliveries appear to be consistent with Cambodian military requirements up to that time.

3. Between July 1968 and early May 1969, four Soviet arms carriers are known to have delivered arms and ammunition, as well as support equipment and spare parts, to Sihanoukville under the Soviet-Cambodian military aid agreement of February 1968. While specific tonnages are not known, the estimated aggregate tonnage of these four shipments together probably does not exceed 2,000 tons at the outside. All of these munitions and support equipment are believed consigned to FARK, thereby partially satisfying Cambodia's future military munitions requirements.

[REDACTED]  
Chief, Trade and Aid Branch

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Distribution:

Original & 1 - Addressee

2 - IS/TA

OER/D/IS/TA [REDACTED] (9 May 69)

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*Not in overall  
damage situation  
section*

Project No. 54.5436-A

Effect of the Bombing in Laos Since 1 November 1968

Estimated logistical requirements for Communist forces in the Laotian Panhandle are presented in Table I. These requirements include an estimate of supply consumption by enemy units as well as supply losses due to Allied air operations. Table II presents the estimated consumption of supplies by class and Table III presents Communist supply losses for the years 1967, 1968 and the first quarter of 1969. Tables IV - VI present similar information for South Vietnam for the years 1967 and 1968. Enemy strength estimates and secondary explosion data for the first quarter of 1969 are not yet available for South Vietnam and therefore enemy resupply requirements for the first quarter of 1969 have not been calculated.

Table 1

Estimated Communist Logistical Requirements, Laotian  
Panhandle 1967-1968 - First Quarter 1969

	Short Tons Per Day					
	1967		1968		1st Quarter 1969	
	<u>Total</u>	<u>External</u>	<u>Total</u>	<u>External</u>	<u>Total</u>	<u>External</u>
Consumption and Expenditures	81.80	52.20 <u>a/</u>	109.90	84.10 <u>a/</u>	118.58	87.07 <u>a/</u>
Losses	14.20	11.70	58.20	41.00	86.40	73.75
TOTAL Consumption and Losses	<u>96.00</u>	<u>63.90 a/</u>	<u>168.10</u>	<u>125.10 a/</u>	<u>204.98</u>	<u>160.82 a/</u>

a/ Includes an estimated 15 tons per day of food from Cambodia.

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Table IV

Estimated Communist Resupply Requirements 1967-1968  
in South Vietnam

	Short Tons Per Day			
	1967		1968	
	<u>Total</u>	<u>External</u>	<u>Total</u>	<u>External</u>
Consumption and Expenditures	211 - 218	54 - 57 <sup>a</sup>	288.50	80.87 <sup>a</sup>
Losses	5.3	5.3	37.38	24.01
TOTAL	<u>216.3 - 223.3</u>	<u>59.3-62.3</u>	<u>319.88</u>	<u>104.88</u> <sup>a</sup>

<sup>a</sup> Includes 35 tons from Cambodia and 15 tons directly across the DMZ.

Table V

Estimated Communist Consumption and Expenditures 1967-1968  
in South Vietnam

Class of Supply	Short Tons Per Day			
	1967		1968	
	<u>Total</u>	<u>External</u>	<u>Total</u>	<u>External</u>
Class I (Food)	177-183	38-40 <sup>a</sup>	236.00	60.00 <sup>a</sup>
Class II - IV (Weapons and Equipment)	23-24	6- 7	35.40	10.63
Class III (POL)	Negl.	Negl.	Negl.	Negl.
Class V (Ammunition)	11	10	11.10	10.64
TOTAL	<u>211-218</u>	<u>54-57</u> <sup>a</sup>	<u>282.50</u>	<u>80.87</u> <sup>a</sup>

<sup>a</sup> Includes 15 tons of food directly across the DMZ and 35 tons of food from Cambodia.

Table VI

Estimated Communist Supply Losses in South Vietnam, 1967-1968

	<u>1967</u>	<u>1968</u>
Captured	1.90 <sup>a</sup> /	26.00
Secondary Explosions	3.40	11.38
TOTAL	<u>5.30</u> <sup>a</sup> /	<u>37.38</u>

<sup>a</sup>/ Does not include food losses. Food losses estimates are not available.

Table VIII

Communist Requirement Requirements (Consumption and Losses)  
in the Laotian Panhandle and South Vietnam  
1967 - 1968 and First Quarter 1969

	Short Tons Per Day					
	1967		1968		1st Quarter 1969	
	<u>Total</u>	<u>External</u>	<u>Total</u>	<u>External</u>	<u>Total</u>	<u>External</u>
Southern Laos	96.	64 a/	168	125 a/	205.	161 a/
South Vietnam	216.-223	59.-62. b/	320	105 b/	NA.	NA b/
TOTAL	<u>312 -319</u>	<u>123 -126 c/</u>	<u>488</u>	<u>230 c/</u>	<u>NA.</u>	<u>NA</u>

a/ Includes 15 tons of food from Cambodia.

b/ Includes 25 tons of food directly from Cambodia, 10 tons from Cambodia via Laos and 15 tons of food across the DMZ.

c/ Includes a total of 50 tons of food from Cambodia and 15 tons across the DMZ.

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in the Laotian Panhandle during the period September 1968 through March 1969.

In each of these incidents the ammunition expended averaged 76 rounds or .122

short tons per incident. An estimate of enemy daily anti-aircraft ammunition

consumption can be obtained by multiplying the number of sorties per day re-

ceiving AAA fire by the .122 short tons per incident

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During the period October 1968 through March 1969 about 24 percent of the

sorties in the Laotian Panhandle reported incidents of anti-aircraft fire and

there were an average of 395 sorties per day. This yields an average of 95

sorties per day receiving AAA fire during this period.  $(395 \times 24 \text{ percent} = 95)$

If an average of .122 short tons is expended per incident of AAA fire and

an average of 95 sorties per day receive AAA fire, then an average of 11.6 short

tons per day of AAA ammunition were expended.

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Summary

25X1 Since the [ ] Report of December, 1968, a re-examination and analysis of  
available information on logistic operations in the southern part of the Lao-  
tian Panhandle has provided some new intelligence, but none sufficiently con-  
clusive to prove beyond doubt that the overland route is the basic logistic sup-  
ply route to South Vietnam. Nevertheless, the evidence gathered during this re-  
examination did show that the enemy's logistic presence in the area continues  
25X1 to be substantial. In addition, [ ] sources have become available to us  
which will increase the overall intelligence on the area. Preliminary data from  
25X1 [ ] during the latter part of April  
show a substantially higher level of logistical activity than has been noted in  
roadwatch or pilot reports. Also, a growing number of guerrilla team reports  
thus far in 1969 have indicated the presence of trucks in the tri-border area.

In general, little new information has become available to us on Communist  
logistical activity from the tri-border area south to III Corps in South Vietnam.

Despite the continuing problem of being able to document enemy activity in  
the southern panhandle, roadwatch data indicate sufficient tonnage continued to  
move into Laos from North Vietnam during the first quarter of 1969 to provide  
all of the requirements of Communist forces in all four Corps areas in South  
Vietnam for military supplies from external sources.

I/L's Contribution to Paragraph 6 of D/I's Terms of Reference for Evaluation of Cambodian Reporting, 2 May 1969

Information on the Overland Route to the Tri-Border Area

Since the Graham Report (December, 1968), a re-examination and analysis of available information on logistic operations in Laos - photography, Forward Air Controller (FAC) reports, road-watch team reports, [ ] captured documents 25X1 and prisoner reports, pilot reports, river watch teams, [ ] has pro- 25X1 vided some new intelligence, but none sufficiently conclusive to prove beyond doubt that the overland route is the basic logistic supply route to South Vietnam.

The re-examination did point up the continuing gaps and limitations in the data and the difficulty in using the sources to study the problem. In general, the information available to us on the southern part of the Laotian Panhandle continues to be inconsistent, not continuous over time, incomplete, and not useful for analyzing logistic flows. In addition, the collection effort in the area has continued to be much lower-keyed than in the northern part of the Panhandle. Roadwatch teams find it difficult to operate in the area due to enemy action against them. This, plus the dense vegetation and rough terrain hinder their placement and location near a road and cause reporting to be sporadic and incomplete. River watch teams on the Se Kong River also have similar problems and only one location has been manned during the past three years. In addition, there have been no attempts to monitor the trail system in the area, which presents a large gap in our knowledge of the enemy's resupply effort.

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another gap in our reporting. Preliminary reports from

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Routes 96, 110, and 165, showed a level

of activity substantially higher than has been reported

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Attack sorties and photo missions along these routes also have been

very low compared to the northern Panhandle, with night operations at a minimum.

As the enemy generally uses the cover of darkness to move, this represents

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another area where our intelligence collection efforts could be improved.

Captured documents and prisoner interrogations have

yielded some information, but these reports are sporadic and only indicate

scattered instances of enemy activity. In some cases, the reports are highly

suspect.

The principal positive result of our re-examination has been the information obtained from aerial reconnaissance - particularly photography spanning a period of several years and pilot reports - which indicates a continuing substantive level of enemy logistic activity in the southern Panhandle.

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Aerial reconnaissance\* over selected targets in the area and along the major infiltration roads in the southern panhandle has provided one of the best sources of intelligence on enemy logistical activity in the area. Evidence of truck activity, sustained moderate to heavy usage of the principle roads, widespread indications of new road construction, road maintenance and rapid repair of damaged roads, POL drums scattered along the roads, as well as heavy trail activity, all point to a substantial enemy logistic presence along the 92/96 route corridor and the tri-border area.

Photography of new road construction and improvements has provided good evidence of the level of enemy operations in the area. During past dry seasons (September - June), the North Vietnamese concentrated on building and improving a road system parallel to the South Vietnamese border with entry into South Vietnam over a series of east-west feeder roads. This supply network was based on the Route 92/96 corridor which connects North Vietnam to the Tri-Border area, South Vietnam, and Cambodia.

Southeast of Attapeu, the Communists built a 20 mile alternate route in September 1968 that parallels a portion of Route 110. Further north, another alternate 8 miles long was built as part of a connection linking Routes 110 and 96. Other key bypasses were built along Route 96 north and south of Chavane to shorten the road and upgrade its capabilities, and to the east of Chavane bypasses were constructed along Route 165 to facilitate vehicular movement

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between the northern portion of Kontum Province in South Vietnam and the Cambodian border. Current traffic densities on Routes 165 and Route 96 south of Chavane do not appear to warrant such extensive construction.

However, aerial reconnaissance over the southern part of the panhandle has been comparatively light and the coverage not consistent over time. Night reconnaissance has been sparse meaning that much of the enemy's logistic movements probably has gone undetected. Furthermore, operational limitations such as adverse weather, cloud cover, and dense vegetation have restricted this source's utility. The end result is that aerial intelligence is necessarily spotty, its main use being to provide evidence of scattered developments rather than monitoring logistic movements over time.

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Since the [redacted] Report, [redacted] sources of intelligence now have been in-

corporated into the continued analysis of this problem. These include [redacted]

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[redacted] reports from guerrilla teams.

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Guerrilla team reports, [redacted] have  
[redacted] proven to be 25X1

valuable in documenting the presence of trucks in the Tri-Border area. These reports have been increasing during the first months of 1969 and should prove a good source of future intelligence. However, operational considerations such as rugged terrain, dense jungle, and operating in a very hostile environment may

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prove to limit this source's usefulness. Preliminary analysis of recent guerilla operations indicates that the duration of a mission averages about 24 hours providing little chance for continuity of observations and subsequent quantitative analysis. Furthermore, these teams, to date, have been authorized to operate only within twenty kilometers of the South Vietnamese border, significantly limiting reconnaissance of the enemy's transborder roadnet.

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From Tri-Border to III Corps

In general the reporting on logistical movement and the Communist development of a logistical apparatus for materiel movement from the tri-border area to III Corps has not undergone a substantial qualitative change. However, there have been several developments worthy of note.

The first of these developments is new intelligence concerning trucks in the tri-border area. PW reports and captured documents have indicated that there are substantially more trucks in this area than had been previously suspected. One PW reported a Communist truck inventory in Attapeu Province, the southeastern most Province in Laos, of 200 vehicles. This is probably too high but captured documents indicate the NVA 40th Artillery Regiment located in Kontum Province has a truck and prime mover inventory of at least 33 vehicles and perhaps as many as 90. Aircraft and friendly guerrilla reporting further indicates frequent enemy vehicular activity in the tri-border area. In fact, an enemy truck convoy (25 trucks) was attacked by friendly aircraft in Kontum Province 25 kilometers south of the tri-border area resulting in 13 secondary explosions and 19 secondary fires.

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Supplies Entering Laos

Roadwatch reporting on the main access routes into Laos (Routes 8, 15, 137, and 1036) during the first quarter of 1969 indicate that sufficient tonnage continued to enter the northern end of the overland logistical route to provide all of the requirements of Communist forces in all four Corps areas in South Vietnam for military supplies from external sources. Estimated requirements include allowances for the enemy's consumption/expenditure of supplies and losses.

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30 April 1969

MEMORANDUM FOR: DD/ER

THROUGH : Chief, IRA

THROUGH : Chief, D/I

SUBJECT : Unloading of Military Cargo in Sihanoukville

1. A review of information on unloading procedures followed in Sihanoukville upon the arrival of ships carrying military materiel has produced more questions than answers on the precise nature and disposition of the cargo. (The attached table, Appendix A, describes reporting on offloading of ships which have delivered, or have been purported to have delivered, military materiel to Sihanoukville in recent years). Gaps and discrepancies in the information available, and what appear to be important variations in port procedures for similar type deliveries, prevent us from formulating a clear or comprehensive picture of standard operating procedures for the handling of military materiel at the port. Moreover, much of the reporting -- especially that of most recent vintage -- is from clandestine sources whose reliability has not been conclusively established. It is only in the light of other intelligence -- clandestine reporting, reporting from prisoners/ralliers and western observers, and the paucity of information on the supply of Communist troops in the southern half of South Vietnam via the land routes from Laos -- that circumstances surrounding Chinese deliveries to Sihanoukville this year, and certain deliveries in 1968 and 1967, suggest that these shipments may have contained materiel destined for the Vietnamese Communists.

2. Still, unless the clandestine reporting reflects a well-coordinated hoax, a few general (and perhaps intriguing) observations would appear to be in order.

a. The Cambodians apparently have treated most recent deliveries of military materiel by Chinese Communist ships in a manner different from most earlier Chinese deliveries, as well as deliveries of Soviet and French military materiel.

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(2). Security precautions surrounding the most recent Chinese deliveries apparently were not very stringent. On the other hand, security for Soviet deliveries and for certain Chinese military deliveries in 1967, 1968, and for most if not all Chinese deliveries before 1967 apparently was very heavy.

(3). Civilian trucking companies and the officials of these companies apparently play a much larger role in the handling of Chinese military deliveries than is the case with Soviet deliveries.

b. FARK apparently supervised the unloading and disposition of almost all seaborne deliveries of military materiel. The Huang Shih shipment in April 1969 is the only suspect military delivery for which a source has specified that FARK was not involved in unloading.

c. One similarity in the unloadings of military or suspected military materiel in Sihanoukville is the priority given to such work. Chinese Communist and Soviet military goods generally appear to be unloaded directly into trucks which then immediately transport the goods out of the port area to military supply depots. Non-military shipments and some French military aid, on the other hand, apparently often are stored in the port area before transshipment inland.

3. These observations are subject to a variety of interpretations. For example:

a. [ ] recent Chinese deliveries could suggest that the normal chain of command and administration in Cambodia is not responsible for the handling of these supplies; it could mean that Cambodian entities follow more secure [ ] when Chinese shipments are involved; or it could mean that these shipments did not contain large quantities of military materiel.

b. The absence of strict security precautions for many Chinese deliveries could also mean that these deliveries fall outside the pattern of other military deliveries, or alternatively, that these deliveries were, in fact, largely non-military in nature.

c. The heavy security apparently surrounding most earlier Chinese deliveries may indicate that the Cambodian Army was the

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ultimate consignee for these shipments. The Soviet shipments, which included aircraft, vehicles and communications equipment and were accompanied by similar heavy security precautions, almost certainly were ultimately consigned to FARK. The lighter security observed during recent unloadings of Chinese shipments, however, may reflect nothing more than a change in procedures in the past year.

d. The heavier use of civilian trucking companies to handle Chinese (compared with Soviet deliveries) may merely indicate that the FARK truck park is not large enough to handle the Chinese deliveries, whereas it is capable of transporting the usually smaller Soviet deliveries. On the other hand, civilian firms may be considered a "safer" channel than FARK transport for the quasi-clandestine movement of Communist-destined materiel.

e. The absence of FARK supervision during the unloading of the Huang Shih could mean that no military supplies were involved, that the cargo was not destined for FARK, or that the civilian companies and officials, by 1969, had acquired sufficient experience and authority to handle the shipment without FARK supervision.

f. The rapid unloadings of some of the ships suspected of delivering arms may be attributed to easily handled cargo or to an emergency situation derived from some unspecified factor such as impending port congestion.

4. Thus, a study of unloading procedures at Sihanoukville does not, by itself, fill in many blanks concerning the contributions of the port to the Vietnamese Communist logistic effort.

Chief, Thailand, Laos and Cambodia

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Distribution

Orig & 1 - Addressee  
1 - IRA  
1 - D/I  
2 - I/TLC

I/TLC/ER [ ] (30 April 1969)

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C. The Case of the Li Ming

1. The primary source claimed to have seen the Chinese Communist ship -- the Li Ming -- unloading what "was well-known on the docks (as) arms" in mid-

January 1969. [redacted] observers, confirmed the arrival of the

ship and the unloading of 6' x 4' x 2' wooden cases "which appeared heavy." [redacted]

*Hak Ly trucks at the port and These same trucks had seen trucks*  
*carrying "small and heavy" loads north from Sihanoukville during the ship's presence at the port*  
 of the Machhim Bopea, Ly Chee and Phnom Penh Transit Companies. [redacted]

source also reported (although it is not clear whether from his own observation)

that the cargo of the Li Ming consisted of 4,800 tons of arms, that Col. [redacted]

[redacted] and over 100 Cambodian army personnel supervised or were otherwise in-

involved in the unloading, and that the cargo was transferred to Kompong Speu by

the three companies listed above and by trucks belonging to Hak Ly itself. [redacted]

[redacted] and Kompong Speu have been implicated in the movement of supplies

to the Communists by other clandestine sources.

2 [redacted] amounted to 900 truckloads -- was destined for Kompong Speu for later delivery

to the VC. [redacted] a customs official speculated that

the cargo contained rockets. The clandestine source, however, did provide

information, which he claims to have obtained from a second subsource, on

another Chinese ship arrival at Sihanoukville in December. No such arrival

has appeared in CIA shipping intelligence.

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Destination of Supplies

The meager information from this source concerning the destination of supplies intended for Communist forces gives us little insight into the routes by which the supplies cross the Cambodian - South Vietnamese border. Except for Mimot, Stung Treng, and (as deduced by the case officer) Snoul, we are not able to locate the destinations indicated by the source. Other sources have cited these 3 towns as transshipment areas for supplies destined for VC/NVA forces. We are not, however, able to estimate the tonnage or types of supplies delivered to the towns.

Capacity of Trucks

We do not believe that trucks in Cambodia are usually as large as indicated by the source. In one report he said that some of the trucks carried more than 8 tons of supplies, and that some carried less; in another, he reported that the average load for trucks used in this traffic is 10 tons. He also said that a few "trailers" were used and that the average trailer load was 8 tons. Although estimates of Cambodian truck inventory include some trucks with these capacities, it is likely that the largest and best trucks in the country are used mainly for the Sihanoukville - Phnom Penh run, the route which carries a major part of all the supplies transported within Cambodia.

We believe that the source is overestimating the capacities of the trucks.

The average-sized truck can carry about 5 metric tons of supplies on paved

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roads. A truck of this size could not transport the quantities of supplies reported by the source (i.e, 100 sacks of rice weighing 100 kilograms, 50 drums of gas and oil, and 8 tons of salt). If the trucks were overloaded - which is a common practice in Indochina - they could probably carry 8 tons of salt, but they still could not accommodate that bulky quantities of rice and POL stated by the source. If the trucks were going to travel over dirt roads, their carrying capacities would be reduced considerably.

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Road and Bridge Capacity

Supplies arriving in Sihanoukville and destined for the Vietnamese Communists along Cambodia's eastern border are most probably moved to Kompong Speu or Phnom Penh via Route 4 from there they are likely to be taken north on either Route 26 or Route 5 to Route 6, then northeast on Route 6 to the junction with Route 7, east on Route 7 to Snuol, and finally farther east toward Dak Dam and the border area on Routes 131 and 14. At least one alternate route exists -- southeast from Phnom Penh on Route 1, then north on 15 to 7 -- but the former route is in better condition, although not without its bottlenecks, and is more likely the one used. Supplies may also be sent up Route 13 from Snuol to Stung Treng on the Lao border and east as far as <sup>Bung Lung</sup> ~~Be-lneo~~ on Route 19.

Route 4 between Sihanoukville and Kompong Speu or Phnom Penh is a surfaced all-weather road in fair to good condition, 23 feet wide, and with a maximum bridge capacity of 30 tons, so there would be no bottlenecks for the movement of supplies along that stretch. Similarly, the strategic segments of Routes 5 and 6 are paved all-weather roads in fair to good condition with bridge capacities of 12 tons -- still of sufficient strength for the heavy vehicle traffic.

Route 7 is also paved, and an all-weather road, but east of Chrum to Snuol numerous pot-holes have been reported and the estimate of maximum capacity of short tons per day for the section drops sharply from that for the western segment. Bridge capacity was reported in a 1967  survey as 8 tons.

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Routes 131 and 14 are improved earth and gravel roads with bridge capacities stated as 4 tons

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~~from~~ Phnom Penh <sup>toured</sup> ~~toward~~ eastern Cambodia in March 1968 and report the segment of Route 131 from Khsim east to the Kratie Province border as being the worst they had ever travelled on, with improved conditions farther east. They attribute the poor conditions to heavy traffic both by wood cutting operations and "ordinary" truck traffic as mentioned by unnamed sources in Mimot and Snuol. Most recently, the Cambodians have been making improvements along Route 131, cutting swaths along it to ward off insurgent ambushes.

25X1 [ ] reports the movement of supply trucks weighing approximately 8 to 12 tons including load from Phnom Penh to the border area. Routes 131 and 14 are primarily fair weather roads, but trucks with 4-wheel drive could probably get through, though with some trouble, even in the rainy season especially of corduroying and similar techniques were employed and tractors were available to pull them through the worst of the mud.

*2  
w/lot doc.*

It is difficult to determine the precision of the stated or estimated bridge capacities or the degree to which the posted limits are observed. Under U.S. specifications, a stress of between 100 and 133 and 1/3 percent of the designed working stress of a bridge can be considered safe and permissible for occasional use and up to 167 and 2/3 percent safe for emergency use. One low-level source reported that truck drivers were not observing the 8-ton limit on certain bridges and that the truckers were paying off the police at the check-points if they were overweight.

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Five low-capacity bridges and conditions varying from poor to good along Route 15 limit its suitability as a supply route. Route 13 is in good condition from Snuol to the Lao border with a bridge capacity of 10 tons. Route 19 east to Bang Lung is in fair condition and bridge capacity as of 1967 is 8 tons. Regular supply activity along this route might be difficult in the rainy season, but is possible. ✓

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